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1. INTRODUCTION 
Few issues have commanded more sustained attention among 
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers than the legal position of 
migrants at both national and international levels. It is certainly a 
topical issue, having gained more prominence and potency in the 
United States since the "9/11" terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. 
Despite the global focus on terrorist infiltration across national 
boundaries, the motivation of most migrants is well-intentioned. 
Around the world today, millions of people are on the move, for good 
reasons, living or trying to live in countries not their own. About 175 
million people today reside outside the country of their birth or na-
tionality. The impetus for this unprecedented movement is varied. 
Sometimes the movement is voluntary. People move across borders 
for work, education, pleasure, curiosity, or family reasons. Migration 
also may be forced, as people flee across national borders for reasons 
of civil unrest, war, natural catastrophes, and famine. In recent 
years, the internal displacement of people within their own states 
also has accelerated. 
Migration often generates tensions. Refugee movements, in par-
ticular, are often sudden and substantial. In destination countries, 
the public response is normally tolerant. Sometimes, however, mi-
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grants are greeted with hostility or outright rejection. They may be 
treated as scapegoats for the ills of society and subjected to differen-
tial treatment and abuse. Such attitudes seem reprehensible but 
may be understandable whenever, as so often happens, the brunt of 
mass migration must be borne by impoverished states unable to ab-
sorb new settlers. 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the historical significance of 
migration to the United States, particularly during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, as the country pushed west-
ward in its manifest destiny. Strong "push" factors impelled waves of 
migrants to leave states of origin just as "pull" factors attracted them 
to the United States. American literature abounds in the stories of 
immigrants, told by Willa Cather, Ole RtHvaag, John Steinbeck, E.L. 
Doctorow, and others. As is so frequently said, the United States is a 
nation of immigrants. 
The immigration and nationality law of the United States is com-
plex. It is more the product of historical experience than logical de-
sign. In one memorable, often-quoted simile, the law bears "a 
striking resemblance" to "King Minos's labyrinth in ancient Crete."l 
Perhaps only the internal revenue (tax) code and its voluminous reg-
ulations are more intricate. Given this complexity, we can only sum-
marize United States migration law.2 The purpose of this article, as 
part of a transnational dialogue, is to locate the migration law of the 
United States within the framework of international migration law 
and to highlight the essential features of the United States law for 
comparison. We begin with an identification of the international le-
gal framework that pertains to the United States. We then turn to 
the characteristics and trends of United States immigration law, con-
cluding with a summary of the law governing the treatment of mi-
grants residing in the United States. 
II. THE POSITION OF MIGRANTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Refugee Convention 
The United States is a party to several treaties addressed to is-
sues of migration. Chief among these is the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention). Ac-
cordingly, the country is bound by the requirements of that Conven-
tion, including its definition of a refugee, its injunction against 
refoulement of persons to destinations where they would face perse-
1. Lok v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 37,38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
2. In keeping with the authors' efforts to simplify this article within the space 
limitations for its publication, we have kept footnoting to a minimum and have 
avoided pin-point citations. For example, we have cited only those treaties to which 
the United States is not a party. All treaties to which the United States is a party 
may be found in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2005). 
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cution, and its requirements for treatment of refugees. The federal 
government divides prospective refugees into two categories: over-
seas refugees, normally lodged by nationality groups in foreign camps 
under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees or other recognized authority; and individual asylees, who 
seek political or other asylum within the Refugee Convention's defini-
tion of a refugee, as incorporated into federal law since 1980. 
Under the Refugee Convention, a refugee is any person with a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
Of these five bases for refugee status, two bases-political opinion 
and membership in a social group-have dominated policymaking, 
administrative decisions, and litigation in the United States. 
The federal government, in reviewing the eligibility of prospec-
tive refugees on a case-by-case basis, has broadened the definition of 
a refugee to include such "social groups" as African women fleeing 
tribal practices of female circumcision or genital mutilation and 
homosexuals fleeing persecution. Foreign policy, too, has tempered 
interpretation of the definition of "political opinion." Until recently, 
for example, federal law entitled most migrants from Fidel Castro's 
Cuba-many of them "boat people" -to refugee status. On the other 
hand, Haitian "boat people" have found it difficult to avoid interdic-
tion in the Caribbean Sea and return to Haiti by the United States 
Coast Guard. 
In the instance of overseas refugees, the United States has 
agreed, as a matter of international solidarity, to cooperate in the re-
location of groups of persons defined by their countries of origin and 
location oftemporary encampment. Accordingly, the President deter-
mines an annual quota for each source region of eligible overseas ref-
ugees. The criteria for establishing the status of overseas refugees 
are therefore less individualized than those for asylees. Overseas ref-
ugees constitute the overwhelming majority of the more than 50,000 
to 100,000 refugees who are normally admitted into the United 
States each year. The total number of refugees declined significantly, 
however, in the quarter century between 1980, when Congress en-
acted legislation under the Refugee Convention, and 2005. 
B. Other Instruments 
The United States is a party to several other migration-related 
instruments, of which three are noteworthy. The Constitution of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Migration requires the United 
States to cooperate in the law-making and implementing work ofthat 
organization. Its projects have ranged from legal and other technical 
assistance in specific countries to broader efforts to encourage equita-
ble redistribution and resettlement of migrants. The United States is 
534 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 54 
also party to the Convention against :orture and. Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Pumshment, wh~ch protects all per-
sons, including migrants, from removal to. countnes where they m~y 
be subject to torture. The Convention agaInst To~ure plays a partlC-
ularly important role in defining the st~tll;s o! mIgrants for purposes 
of admission and protecting them from InJUTIOUS refoulement. 
The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to 
which the United States is a party, establishes basic rights to leave 
any country and to :eturn to one's own country. !hese righ~s are su~­
ject only to restrictIOns necessary to pro.tect natIOnal secunty, pubhc 
order, public health or morals, or the TIghts and freedoms of others 
and which are consistent with the other rights recognized in the Cov-
enant. In practice, the Covenant is non-self-executing under United 
States law and therefore requires implementing legislation that, if it 
existed, would give persons standing to invoke its provisions. In ef-
fect, however, the rights enshrined in the Covenant, to which mi-
grants and others are entitled, are seldom controversial in the United 
States. To be sure, the country does exercise its power to exclude 
returning lawful permanent residents (LPRs). One might argue that 
an LPR's "own country" is that of his or her residence or domicile, but 
the right to return is normally interpreted to require citizenship-
that is, to identify "one's own country" as the country of which one is 
a citizen or national. 
C. International Custom 
The United States has accepted the general practice of a state's 
qualified duty to admit aliens when they pose no serious danger to its 
public safety, security, general welfare, or essential institutions. A 
regulated openness to migrants reflects an opinio juris of the global 
community. In reality, very few states that are potentially attractive 
to migrants bar admission in the name of sovereign prerogative. 
Within margins of appreciation, therefore, the United States has not 
adhered to judicial and other pronouncements of an unfettered "sov-
ereign" competence to bar immigration. 3 
Even the principal Supreme Court opinions4 of the late nine-
teenth century that are cited to support extravagant claims of"sover-
3. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under 
International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983); accord, RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNA-
TIONAL MIGRATION LAw xiv (2d ed. 1988) ("dispelling the notion that the control of 
nationality and migration falls within the reserved domain [of the sovereign state]. 
The qualifications that need to be made to that assertion are now so clear that they 
speak for themselves."). 
4. See Chae Chang Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Clause), 130 
U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sover-
eignty belonging to the government of the United States ... cannot be granted away 
or restrained on behalf of anyone."); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 
659 (1892) ("It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation 
• 
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eign" authority to bar all immigration are themselves qualified.5 To 
the extent that these opinions can be interpreted to adopt an unquali-
fied restrictionist premise, they contradicted the best evidence of cur-
rent norms of international law. In 1892, precisely when the 
controversial Supreme Court opinions were issued, the Institute of 
International Law adopted International Regulations on the Admis-
sion and Expulsion of Aliens. These Regulations confirmed in some 
specificity the principle of due regard for the historic right of mi-
grants to enter a foreign state's territory to the extent compatible 
with that state's security.6 Terrorist threats, of course, present the 
most poignant example of exceptions to the qualified duty to cooper-
ate in the process of migration and sensible resettlement of migrants. 
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid 
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and 
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
159 U.S. 698, 705-07 (1893) ("it is an accepted maxim of international law that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-pres-
ervation, to conditionally admit or expel foreigners."). 
5. In sum, even a strict constitutional constructionist could find little com-
pulsion in the case law for the proposition that a state may exclude all aliens 
absolutely. Three of the four leading opinions are nearly a hundred years 
old, three applied exclusion doctrines principally to uphold racial or ideologi-
cal tests acceptable then but questionable today, and one misapplied cited 
authority. Moreover, three of the four opinions predated comprehensive im-
migration laws, and therefore may have gone as far as they did in lieu of 
broad statutory rules. Most importantly, the definitive opinions in The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting qualified the excludability of aliens 
by citing international legal authority to the effect that a state can exclude 
aliens only when they present a danger to the peace and security of the coun-
try. Subsequent opinions that failed to acknowledge this limitation on sover-
eign power mostly addressed other issues such as the allocation of powers 
among branches of the federal Government. Reaffirmations of the exclusive 
power of the political branches of government to make rules for the admis-
sion of aliens have been "legion." Other opinions relied upon semantic dis-
tinction, since discarded, between a right and a privilege, or, as in 
Kleindienst u. Mandel, simply failed to cite precedent contextually, com-
pletely, and correctly. 
Nafziger, supra note 3, at 828. 
6. ARTICLE 6. Free entrance of aliens to the territory of a civilized State 
may not be generally and permanently forbidden except in the public interest 
and for very serious reasons, for example, because of fundamental differences 
in customs or civilization, or because of a dangerous organization or gather-
ing of aliens who come in great numbers ... 
ARTICLE 7. The protection of national labor is not, in itself, a sufficient rea-
son for non-admission .... 
ARTICLE 12. Entrance to a country may be forbidden to any alien individual 
in a condition of vagabondage or beggary, or suffering from a malady liable to 
endanger the public health, or strongly suspected of serious offenses commit-
ted abroad against the life or health of human beings or against public prop-
erty or faith, as well as to aliens who have been convicted of the said offenses. 
12 INST. DROIT INT'L ANNUAIRE 218 et seq. (1892-94). For minutes of the proceedings 
convened to draft the regulations, see id. at 184-218. For an English translation of 
the regulations, see RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 104 et seq. 
(J. Scott ed. 1916). 
L 
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The strength of international custom is apparent in judicial pro-
nouncements holding that the prohibition of torture is jus cogens, no 
derogation from which is permitted regardless of a state's obligations 
under the Convention against Torture. Custom is also effective in 
helping ensure compliance with basic rules of international humani-
tarian law, as we shall see in the next section of this article. 
D. Lex Ferenda: Internally Displaced Persons 
The plight of internally displaced persons (IDPs)-those persons 
fleeing particular circumstances but unable to escape across a na-
tional boundary-has only recently come within the purview of inter-
national law. A protective regime is emerging, but it is still lex 
ferenda. This body of soft law may be summarized as follows. 
Two instruments articulate basic expectations about the treat-
ment of IDPs. These expectations are rooted in the law of human 
rights, humanitarian law, and refugee law. The two instruments are 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding Princi-
ples), which were developed by the Representative of the United Na-
tions Secretary-General on IDPs, and the London Declaration of 
International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons 
(London Declaration), which was adopted by the International Law 
Association. 7 The London Declaration has been submitted to govern-
ments and international organizations for their consideration and 
possible adoption. 
Of these two instruments, the London Declaration is broader and 
more recent. As we shall see, it also is unique in addressing the 
needs of victims of natural disasters such as the devastating earth-
quakes and tsunamis in Asia (2004), hurricanes in the United States 
(2005), and earthquake in South Asia (2005). 
The London Declaration contains eighteen articles that set forth 
rights and obligations pertaining to IDPs for all states, de facto au-
thorities, the United Nations, and other organizations, both govern-
mental and nongovernmentaL These articles establish a regime of 
protection that includes minimum standards of treatment, require-
ments for international cooperation, and supervision by international 
authority. The London Declaration also includes substantial article-
by-article comments. An extensive definition of IDPs includes 
persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result 
of armed conflict, internal strife or systematic violations of 
7. The London Declaration was drafted by a committee of the International Law 
Association chaired by Dr. Luke T. Lee. The co-rapporteurs were Rainer Hofmann 
and Yukio Shimada. This description of the London Declaration is drawn from a 
fuller account written by Dr. Lee and Professor Nafziger, in the ABILA Newsletter, 
No. 60, Feb. 2001, at 2. 
-l 
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human rights, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized State border. This Declaration applies also to 
persons internally displaced by whatever causes, such as 
natural or man-made disasters or large-scale developmental 
projects, whenever the responsible State or de facto author-
ity fails, for reasons that violate fundamental human rights, 
to protect and assist those victims. 
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The London Declaration takes note of the Guiding Principles. 
Unlike the latter, however, the London Declaration highlights the 
unique status of IDPs as de facto refugees confined in their national 
territories and therefore in need of a special protective regime. As 
already noted, the London Declaration also adopts a new and broader 
definition of IDPs and extends beyond the limited scope of the Guid-
ing Principles to deal with a number of difficult issues. These include 
the status of safe areas, the prevention of reverse ethnic cleansing, 
institutional arrangements to provide protection and assistance to 
IDPs, and a definition of the Security Council's role when internal 
displacement amounts to a threat to international peace and secur-
ity. In its final report, the ILA Committee on Internally Displaced 
Persons noted that an international organization, such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, could be designated or a 
new one established, to assume the responsibility of protecting and 
assisting all displaced persons-both refugees and IDPs. 
The extent to which the London Declaration and the Guiding 
Principles codify general practice, on one hand, or can serve only to 
progressively develop practice in the United States, on the other 
hand, is unclear. A pathfinding study of customary international hu-
manitarian law by the International Committee of the Red Cross8 
disclosed several important rules of general practice on behalf of 
IDPs in time of armed conflict. These rules include non-deportability 
of IDPs from occupied territory; minimum conditions of shelter, hy-
giene, health, safety, nutrition, and avoidance of separation among 
family members; the right to voluntary return; and property rights. 
United States practice is somewhat mixed. For example, during 
the American military occupation of Iraq, the customary rules for 
protecting IDPs were generally well-respected despite the chaos of 
war. During natural disasters within the United States, however, 
the protection of IDPs may have been somewhat compromised. 
When, in 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita generated mass dis-
placement in Louisiana and Texas, it became questionable whether 
the United States was as fully prepared or responsive as it should 
have been in compliance with the expectations of the London Decla-
8. INTERNATIONAL COMMITl'EE OF THE RED CROSS, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 457-75 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds. 
2005). 
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ration. The official responses by national, state, and local govern-
ments appear to have been confused and delayed in the instance of 
Katrina but greatly improved and effective a month later when the 
less devastating Rita ripped through the same coastal region of the 
country. Despite the deficiencies of disaster relief after Hurricane 
Katrina, however, it is clear that, within the London Declaration's 
definition of an IDP, the United States did not "fail for reasons that 
violate fundamental human rights to protect and assist" the victims. 
Although the vast majority of the IDPs were African-Americans, 
claims of racism generally proved to be groundless. 
It is also clear that the global community responded well to the 
hurricane disasters, just as it had in late 2004 and early 2005 in re-
sponse to the devastating tsunamis in Asia. This evidence of global 
solidarity offers promise that the provisions of the London Declara-
tion, in the wake of natural disasters, at least, may eventually articu-
late a general practice of prompt and effective relief as a matter of 
global solidarity. 
E. Definition of a {{Migrant" 
One lay definition of the term "migrant" can be understood to 
mean, quite simply, a person who lives temporarily or permanently in 
the territory of a state other than that of the person's origin or na-
tionality. Sometimes the migrant has acquired significant social ties 
to a foreign state of migration, other times not. A narrower defini-
tion, perhaps contemplating seasonal movement of workers within a 
single country rather than international resettlement, defines a "mi-
grant" as one who moves frequently to find work. Given this varia-
tion, it will be instructive to consider two authoritative definitions of 
the term in the international system. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (Convention on Migrant 
Workers), which entered into force July 1, 2003 but to which the 
United States is not a party, defines a migrant worker restrictively as 
a "person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a 
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national."9 
9. Art. 2(1), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1990, 
Annex to U.N. Doc. N45/158 (1990). The Preamble to the Convention identifies sev-
eral underlying human rights instruments, including the following agreements of the 
International Labor Organization, which are generally limited, like the Convention, 
to migrant workers: the Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No. 97), 
the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of 
Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143), the Recom-
mendation concerning Migration for Employment (No. 86), the Recommendation con-
cerning Migrant Workers (No. 151), the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour (No. 29), and the Convention concerning Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105). 
Preamble, id. 
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Although the Convention protects only workers, it applies regardless 
of their documented or undocumented status. 
The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, on the other hand, has proposed that the following 
persons should be considered migrants: (1) Persons who are outside 
the territory of the State of which they are not national citizens, are 
not subject to its legal protection, and are in the territory of another 
State; (2) Persons who do not enjoy the general legal recognition of 
rights which is in the granting by the host State of the status ofrefu-
gee, naturalized person or similar status; and (3) Persons who do not 
enjoy general legal protection of their fundamental rights by virtue of 
diplomatic agreements, visas or other agreements. United States 
law, however, does not make these kinds of distinctions; rather, all 
persons seeking admission as foreigners into the United States are 
deemed to be migrants. For present purposes, then, it is necessary to 
adopt the broad, lay definition of a migrant with which this section of 
the article began. 
III. THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL 
A. Basic Legal Framework and Institutions 
Until the late nineteenth century, the United States had no sig-
nificant laws on migration. The individual states of the Union were 
generally free to impose their own controls, constrained as they were 
by a tendency in the still-developing country to attract rather than 
exclude prospective contributors to the economy and settlers of the 
land. After the Civil War (1861-65), however, the federal government 
began to assume exclusive regulatory powers over immigration. Dur-
ing the period 1875-91, Congress gradually prohibited or regulated 
immigration of certain classes of persons, eventually including prosti-
tutes, convicts, "lunatics," "idiots," paupers and others likely to be-
come public charges, the "diseased," and polygamists. Variants or 
subgroups within these classes were added later. By the early twen-
tieth century, Congress had also largely barred Japanese and Chi-
nese immigration. What is the constitutional foundation for federal 
authority to regulate immigration? 
The United States Constitution has no bedrock provision for allo-
cating powers among the three branches of the government or other-
wise dealing with issues of migration. The constitutional basis for 
the exercise of power over migration is therefore unclear. To be sure, 
Congress is empowered to enact laws of naturalization, but it is 
highly debatable whether this power implies more general powers, 
vis-a.-vis the states, over immigration. Also, scattered constitutional 
provisions bearing on immigration have been interpreted to enable 
the federal government to enact, execute, and adjudicate migration 
laws. The most important of these provisions is the Interstate Com-
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merce Clause, which empowers Congress to regulate commerce 
among the several states and with foreign nations. Even that provi-
sion, however, is problematic because it requires a classification of 
human beings as commerce. Despite the precarious constitutional 
foundation, however, Congress has not hesitated to enact immigra-
tion legislation. 
The current codification of immigration law is the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952,10 as amended. Within the executive 
branch of the federal government, the chief agencies of implementa-
tion are lodged in the Department of Homeland Security. Until the 
latter's establishment in 2003, as an institutional response to the 
threat of terrorism, the Department of Justice was primarily respon-
sible for executing the law. Other implementing agencies are found 
within the Department of State (visa issuance and backup in the ref-
ugee process), the Department of Labor (certification of labor peti-
tions on behalf of prospective immigrants in certain categories), and 
the Department of Health and Human Services (health requirements 
of prospective immigrants). 
The states of the Union also participate in the process of labor 
certification and, on a somewhat discretionary basis, cooperation in 
enforcement of the law. Under the preemption doctrine, however, the 
states may not interfere with the federal power over immigration. 
Thus, the states may not regulate any aspect of immigration when a 
federal statute has already occupied that aspect, even when the state 
regulation is consistent with the federal law. 
B. The General Theory of Control 
The United States system of immigration control has been de-
scribed as an insular-Western Hemispheric system by contrast to the 
continental European system.!l Accordingly, the United States 
maintains more of a pre-admission and admission-based system of 
control over immigrants rather than post-admission system. Al-
though this distinction is increasingly blurred in practice, the United 
States still relies on highly detailed provisions and procedures for 
classification of persons in advance of approved migration, visa issu-
ance, and admission at ports of entry. On the other hand, unlike 
post-admission systems, the United States places much less reliance 
on work permits, residence permits, and national identity cards as 
control devices. 
Indeed, the United States has no national identity card, for rea-
sons of civil liberties. Thus, any post-entry identification of immi-
grants must rely, variously, on multiple documentation, including 
10. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000). 
11. See Richard Plender, Trends in National Immigration Control, 35 INT'L & 
COMPo L.Q. 531, 535, 550-51 (1986). 
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birth certificates, state drivers licenses, and social security cards. 
Also, historically, exit controls over departing foreigners have been 
weak. Until recently, there was little effort made to record all depar-
ture dates and circumstances, mostly for a lack of adequate funding. 
Over the years, the United States system of control has become 
mixed, with elements of both the insular-Western Hemispheric model 
of pre-admission controls and the continental European system of 
post-admission controls. For example, certain categories of immi-
grants require labor certification; and visa holders, after their admis-
sion into the United States, must notify the government of any 
changes of their residence in the United States. This requirement 
has been particularly emphasized since 9/11. 
C. Classification of Migrants 
1. Non-immigrants 
The chart in the Annex to this article indicates that over 30 mil-
lion non-immigrants were admitted into the United States in 2004. 
Non-immigrants are persons admitted into the United States for spe-
cific purposes, including, for example, business, pleasure, education, 
and temporary work. They must receive visas, typically stipulating 
temporary visits for fixed durations. Each class of immigrants is as-
signed a separate letter for purposes of visa issuance. Thus, for ex-
ample, tourists are "B2" and students may be either "F" or "J." 
Although refugees are also admitted temporarily for a specific, hu-
manitarian purpose, they are not classified as non-immigrants. Con-
gress has also established temporary worker programs to 
accommodate worker shortages in the United States. The bracero 
program, in particular, was designed to attract large numbers of 
Mexican workers to serve emergency needs during World War II. 
Workers were actively recruited in Mexico to sign employment con-
tracts for "temporary" work in the United States. The program lasted 
several decades and resulted in large numbers of more or less perma-
nent visa overstays. 
2. Immigrants 
The Immigration and Nationality Act defines immigrants as all 
aliens (that is, non-citizens), except nonimmigrant aliens. Other fun-
damental terms in the immigration lexicon of the United States in-
clude "resident alien" (all persons living in the United States who are 
not citizens or nationals) and LPRs (aliens who are "lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence"). By virtue of lawful admittance, immi-
grants are accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the 
United States and may be eligible for citizenship (within five years, 
but an LPR married to an American citizen is eligible to become a 
citizen in three years). 
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Immigrant visas are issued under four headings: family-related 
immigrants, employment-based immigrants, refugees (including 
asylees), and diversity immigrants (in the sense of correcting imbal-
ances of nationality in practice). Immediate relatives are exempt 
from visa requirements. Both the family-related and employment-
based headings are further specified. The family-related heading is 
divided into prioritized preference categories, generally according to 
the extent of consanguinity of applicants with certain classes of 
United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. An adjusta-
ble total of 465,000 family-based visas, not including immediate rela-
tives, may be issued in one year. Immigrants by virtue of marriage to 
an American citizen or LPR and their children must satisfY a two-
year conditional residency requirement. Couples seeking to remove 
the condition at the end of two years must be prepared to show that 
they did not enter into the marriage solely to secure LPR status-the 
so-called "green card"-for a non-citizen spouse. They must also 
show, with a few exceptions, that the couple was not divorced during 
the two-year period. 
The employment-based heading of immigrants is further speci-
fied by preference categories according to level of professional prow-
ess and occupational skills. Numerical quotas are assigned to all 
employment-based categories and all family-related categories except 
immediate relatives. An adjustable total of 180,000 employment-
based visas may be issued each year. Labor certification is also re-
quired for some, but not all, of the employment-based categories. The 
chart in the Annex lists the total number of non-immigrants and im-
migrants admitted into the United States in 2004 by general 
categories. 
3. Adjustment of Status 
Ordinarily, with very few exceptions, non-immigrants who have 
entered the United States lawfully and have maintained a lawful sta-
tus are entitled to adjust their status from one visa category to an-
other or to immigrant status. Generally, eligible persons may do so 
without leaving the country. Of course, any person ineligible for ad-
justment of status-for example, someone who has overstayed their 
visa or accepted unauthorized employment-may simply return to 
their horne country and apply for a new visa at the consulate in their 
home district. 
D. Grounds for Non-Admissibility and Removal 
The grounds for non-admissibility of applicants and undocu-
mented entrants and removal of foreign nationals are elaborate. The 
grounds for non-admissibility and removal are similar but not identi-
cal, falling into five categories: immigration control (distinguishing 
--
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persons on the basis of the legitimacy of their status under the immi-
gration law), political and national security, criminal, economic, and 
public health and morals. In recent years, several ideological ves-
tiges of the Cold War have been eliminated, such as exclusion of 
members or former members of the Communist Party, whereas anti-
terrorism and criminal grounds (particularly involving aggravated 
felonies and drug offenses) have been strengthened. 
Unlike non-citizens applying for admission into the United 
States, persons already in the United States but subject to removal 
are generally entitled to a hearing in satisfaction of the requirements 
of due process. The test of what constitutes due process in a given 
case involves a determination of whether a life, liberty, or property 
interest is at stake. If so, then three factors must be balanced on a 
case-by-case basis: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action [for example, of removal from the United States]; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute requirement would entail. 12 
Non-citizens are also entitled to administrative review and judicial 
review, in some circumstances, of removal orders. 
Most persons subject to removal from the United States, how-
ever, elect to depart the country voluntarily without a removal hear-
ing. The incentive for doing so is that a voluntary departure does not 
carry the risk of a formal removal (that is, deportation), with its puni-
tive constraints on later return to the United States and, in some 
circumstances, total bar on return. Besides voluntary departure, dis-
cretionary relief from removal includes, first, cancellation of removal 
to the benefit of non-citizens who have resided in the country for ex-
tended periods of time, in order to ameliorate what otherwise would 
be a potentially severe effect of removal. Eligibility for cancellation of 
removal involves specific criteria of continuous presence in the 
United States for ten years and several requirements of good moral 
character and non-excludability. Other discretionary relief from re-
moval includes adjustment of status, asylum, stay of removal, and 
parole by an executive order. 
12. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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E. Administrative and Judicial Review of Legislation and 
Decisions 
[Vol. 54 
A cardinal doctrine of United States constitutional law is that 
Congress has an inherent, plenary power in matters of immigration. 
"[Olver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress 
more complete than it is [over the admission ofnon-citizensl."13 The 
most important implication of this formidable power is to bar judicial 
review of legislation, with some exceptions. The courts have gone so 
far as to pronounce that "whatever the procedure authorized by Con-
gress, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concemed."14 
As a corollary, the executive branch, acting within its constitutional 
authority, enjoys derivative power free of judicial review. To be sure, 
Congress has provided for administrative review-primarily under 
the Administrative Procedure Act-and judicial review of executive 
decisions. But there is only a very limited range of administrative 
and judicial review available with respect to decisions on admission-
that is, of decisions by United States consular offices abroad to ex-
clude persons from entering the country.15 
The plenary power vested in Congress bars review of legislation 
and executive measures altogether in many cases. That is unique in 
American governmental practice. Even when courts exercise review 
powers in matters of immigration, they are deferential to the political 
branches. Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, the nor-
mal standard for review of legislation is whether it is arbitrary or 
capricious. The normal standard for review of an executive decision 
or regulation is whether the decision or regulation represents an 
abuse of discretion. 
IV. TRENDS IN ADMISSION AND REMOVAL OF IMMIGRANTS AND IN 
PUBLIC OPINION 
A. Current Migration FlowS I6 
Immigration to the United States reached a peak of about 1.5 
million in 2000, not including non-immigrants. Between 2000 and 
2004, immigration to the United States declined substantially to less 
than 1 million (see figures for 2004 in the Annex). Historically, the 
expansion and contraction of the U.S. economy seems to be the most 
13. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). Ac-
cord, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (immigration measures are "largely im-
mune from judicial review."). 
14. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
15. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 144-
58,469-85 (4th ed. 2005); James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular 
Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1,25-35 (1991). 
16. Nina Bernstein, Decline is Seen in Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at 
1. 
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plausible explanation of such fluctuations in migration. But anti-ter-
rorist constraints since 9/11 also may have deterred visa applicants 
and therefore may help explain the lower numbers in the years im-
mediately following 9/11. Two other trends are noteworthy: the des-
tinations in the United States of newly arrived immigrants have 
broadened substantially and the estimated number of undocumented 
(largely Mexican) migrants entering the United States each year now 
exceeds the number of documented immigrants. 
B. Enforcement of Immigration Laws 17 
In 2004, immigration violations replaced drug crimes as the lead-
ing category of federal prosecutions. So dramatic is the rise in the 
number of prosecutions under immigration laws that they more than 
doubled between 2002 (16,300) and 2004 (38,000). The data reveal 
that the trend is attributable to a deliberate shift in priorities by fed-
eral law-enforcement agencies, largely in response to the threat of 
terrorism after 9/11. Drug investigation has been markedly diverted 
to investigation of immigration violations. 
C. Public Opinion 
In projecting trends in United States immigration law, public 
opinion is an important factor. Fundamentally, even after 9/11, 
Americans have favored a steady flow of immigration in the nation's 
economic and other interests. 1S The country has steadfastly kept its 
arms open to prospective migrants. The devil, however, has been in 
the details of control. Given the salience of immigration issues and 
the sensitivity of people toward new neighbors, fluctuating public at-
titudes over the years have been unusually influential in shaping ad-
justments of both procedure and substance in the law. Sometimes 
the public wants a more open door to migrants, other times more of a 
closed door. Congress has typically responded in cycles of liberality 
and restriction within acceptable margins of appreciation. 
A 2005 poll of public opinion concerning United States foreign 
policy overwhelmingly indicated disenchantment with efforts to pro-
17. Eric Lichtblau, Prosecutions in Immigration Doubled in Last Few Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A27. See also Eric Lipton, Report Finds U.S. Failing on 
Overstays of Visas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005 (reporting on the serious problem of an 
estimated 3.6 million visa violators and lack of enforcement to pursue them). 
18. The United States is a nation of immigrants with the motto "e pluribus 
unum" (from many one), a reminder that Americans share the experience of 
themselves or their forebears leaving another country to begin anew in the 
US. (footnote omitted] Most Americans believe that immigration is in the 
national interest, and this belief did not change after the September 11, 2001 
terrorism attacks, as political leaders consistently drew a distinction be-
tween immigrants and terrorists. 
PHILIP L. MARTIN, SUSTAINABLE MIGRATION POLICIES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 16 
(2003). 
.. 
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tect U.S. borders from undocumented migration. To be sure, that has 
been a persistent concern throughout American history. Its implica-
tions for legal reform are therefore uncertain. What is significant, 
however, is that, according to the 2005 poll, only 25% of the public 
assigned good grades ("A" or "B") to the federal government in its en-
forcement of border controls over immigration. That low level of ap-
proval ranked third from the bottom of twenty stated expectations 
about United States foreign policy, ranging from "hunting down anti-
American terrorists" to "making international trade agreements that 
benefit the U.S." 
v. TREATMENT OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Constitutional Framework 
International human rights law requires all states to comply 
with minimum standards for treatment of non-citizens. Special stan-
dards apply to refugees and IDPs, as noted earlier. Aside from these 
requirements, the treatment of non-citizens in the United States is 
largely defined by the Bill of Rights and later amendments in the 
United States Constitution. Although the long line of jurisprudence 
testing the parameters of such constitutional protection is beyond the 
scope of this article, a brief summary of it may be helpful for the pur-
pose of comparison. 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law summarizes 
the accumulated authority under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution as follows: 
(1) An alien in the United States is entitled to all the guar-
antees of the Constitution of the United States other 
than those expressly reserved for citizens. 
(2) Under Subsection (1), an alien in the United States may 
not be denied the equal protection of the laws, but equal 
protection does not preclude reasonable distinctions be-
tween aliens and citizens, or between different categories 
of aliens. 19 
The federal government's powers to discriminate on the basis of 
alienage, especially in matters of employment, are broader than 
those of the states. In reviewing the extent of such federal powers, 
the courts apply the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.2o This is 
manifest in certain provisions of the immigration law itself, which 
may impose a durational residence on non-citizens-for example, 
three years from the date of a non-citizen's admission into the United 
States-to establish eligibility for welfare and other benefits. 
19. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE LAw OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 722 (1987). 
20. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) . 
-l 
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The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids the 
states of the Union from denying "the equal protection ofthe laws" to 
all "persons" within their jurisdictions. As early as 1886, in Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins,21 the United States Supreme Court confirmed that "[t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution is not limited to citi-
zens."22 Subsequent decisions have defmed the extent of this equal 
protection and therefore the extent to which the states may constitu-
tionally enact or adopt other discriminatory measures on the basis of 
alienage. 
A "strict scrutiny" by courts of state discrimination based on sus-
pect classifications of persons-race and religion, for example-has 
been extended to instances of discrimination on the basis of alienage. 
There are some exceptions, however. The seminal case law of the 
1970s and 1980s is especially instructive. In Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido,23 for example, the Court upheld a California statute barring 
non-citizens from employment as "peace officers." Three lawfully ad-
mitted permanent resident aliens who had been denied jobs under 
the statute challenged it on equal protection and statutory grounds. 
The Court based its decision solely on an equal protection analysis, 
relying on Foley v. Connelie,24 which upheld a New York statute re-
quiring state police officers to be U.S. citizens. 
Cabell falls in a line of cases that entails something of a retreat 
from the broad grant of equal protection rights for aliens begun by 
the Court in Graham v. Richardson.25 There the Court implied that 
only in very few areas could a state permissibly discriminate against 
aliens who, as a discrete and insular minority, were afforded a judi-
cial review standard of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny no longer is 
required of state actions, however, where they can be reasonably 
characterized as having been taken in order to "preserve the basic 
conception of a political community."26 
Another pertinent constitutional issue besides equal protection is 
whether a state, by imposing certain conditions on its residents re-
lated to immigration, infringes upon powers otherwise reserved to 
the federal government. For example, the California Labor Code pro-
hibits employers from knowingly employing aliens not entitled to res-
idence in the United States if such employment would have an 
adverse effect on lawful resident workers. In DeCanas v. Bica,27 the 
United States Supreme Court held that those provisions do not vio-
21. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
22. [d. at 369. 
23. 454 U.S. 432 (1982). 
24. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
25. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
26. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
27. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
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late the doctrine of federal preemption or infringe on the exclusive 
congressional power over naturalization and immigration. 
Very often, however, the federal preemption issues are set in a 
more complex context, such as that of state benefits to undocumented 
workers. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations 
Board,28 the United States Supreme Court held that federal immi-
gration policy precluded the Board from awarding back wages to un-
documented workers who had been fired in violation of federal law. 
The rationale was that to do so would trench upon explicit statutory 
prohibitions that are critical to federal immigration policy. In 
Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp.,29 however, the New York Su-
preme Court ruled, on review of a tort action, that an undocumented 
worker was entitled to recover back pay, regardless of a federal law 
prohibiting the hiring of undocumented workers. The New York 
court held that the Hoffman rule did not extend to state court per-
sonal injury and workplace safety cases or common law torts. The 
court reasoned that there is no public policy interest in denying re-
covery to undocumented workers. To the contrary, doing so would 
defeat a fundamental interest of the state in encouraging employers 
to ensure workplace safety for all workers, regardless of their citizen-
ship or immigration status. 
B. Anti-Terrorist Measures 
After the 9/11 attack, the 2001 Foreign Terrorists Tracking Force 
was formed.30 Numerous non-citizens were arrested and detained. 
Some were charged with criminal activity pending investigation, 
while some were held as material witnesses. Some were deported for 
use of fraudulent documents, illegal entry, overstaying visas, and 
other immigration-related offenses. United States courts had to hear 
their claims concerning their civil rights and liberties. 
A second legislative initiative, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 
gave the Attorney General the power to detain non-citizens suspected 
of terrorism. The Attorney General was required to charge them 
with a crime, initiate deportation, or release them within seven days. 
Administrative regulations have been expanded to let a detainee be 
held 48 hours without charge for an additional "reasonable period of 
28. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
29. 802 N.Y.S.2d 56, (2005). 
30. When the then Attorney General introduced the new measures, he said as 
follows: 
We will arrest and detain any suspected terrorist who has violated the law. 
If suspects are found not to have links to terrorism or not to have violated the 
law, they will be released. But terrorists who are in violation of the law will 
be convicted, in some cases deported, and in all cases be prevented from fur-
ther harm to Americans. 
LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF Loss, ch. 3, at 12 (2002). 
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time" in extraordinary circumstances. Certification of a suspected 
terrorist must be reviewed every six months to be renewed or re-
voked. The government has used the detention power sparingly. 
The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 
(NSEERS) for members of stipulated groups, also known as special 
registration, provides an improved legal basis for tracking possible 
terrorists. Non-immigrants who pose "national security risks," as de-
termined by federal government, are subject to fingerprinting, 
photographing, and special registration. The stipulated groups are 
largely defined as males over the age of sixteen from heavily Muslim 
countries of origin. These three initiatives are among the most im-
portant legislative and executive actions that were taken after 9/11 in 
response to the new threat of terrorism. 
c. Border Issues 
Historically, the longest unfortified national borders in the world 
have been those between the United States and its neighbors, Ca-
nada and Mexico. Even the fencing that was installed in recent years 
along the Mexican border as well as the enlistment of volunteer pa-
trols in heavily trafficked areas have only a very limited geographical 
range. The United States-Mexican border is also the longest, if not 
the only major one between a developed and a developing country. 
Although the U.S.-Canadian border and other ports of entry, includ-
ing airports, have assumed greater significance since 9/11, the U.S.-
Mexico border remains the focus of immigration control. Border is-
sues involve the influx of undocumented migrants, the process of ad-
mission at designated stations along the border, patrolling for and 
removal of non-admissible migrants, and, more recently, the threat of 
terrorist infiltration. 
It is estimated that some 11 million undocumented aliens reside 
in the United States, a majority of whom are Mexican. Their pres-
ence bespeaks the intractability of border controls and the ease of 
seasonal and repeated migration back and forth across the border. 
The "push" and "pull" factors of migration are apparent along the bor-
der, day in and day out. From time to time, Congress has granted 
amnesty to undocumented migrants, thereby enabling them to be-
come LPRs and eventually citizens. The federal government has also 
suspended sanctions against employers of undocumented aliens 
when migrant workers are especially needed, for example, in the af-
termath of Hurricane Katrina. 
In order to enter the United States in the first place, however, 
many undocumented migrants have trekked through the California 
and Arizona deserts in oppressive heat, rubbed garlic on their skin to 
ward off rattlesnakes, swum across the All-American Canal and Rio 
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frigid weather. They have suffocated in the airless trucks of smug-
glers, died in vehicle crashes, been struck by lightning, or drowned. 
Too often migrants have been preyed upon by their Mexican handlers 
(often called "coyotes"), U.S.-based contractors (frequently non-citi-
zens), and criminals who assault, rob, and kill them. In sum, desper-
ate migrants risk their lives crossing unguarded and desolate 
frontiers to avoid stepped-up border patrols in populated areas. 
In reviewing the constitutionality of law enforcement measures 
along the border, under the 'immigration law, the United States Su-
preme Court has delineated margins of authority and established 
standards of search and seizure. In one of its decisions, United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce,31 the Court acknowledged that undocumented 
aliens "are vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain 
of substandard working conditions without risking deportation"32 
and that they "are frequently victims of extortion, violence and sharp 
practices" after giving themselves over to professional "alien 
smugglers."33 
Advocacy groups have criticized border patrol policies, which 
they claim are responsible for increasing the death toll and injury of 
migrants at the borders. Whether this argument is right or wrong is 
less important than efforts at all levels of government to address the 
plights of migrants at the border, despite the difficulty of separating 
militant terrorists from innocent migrants. 
The Preamble to the Convention on Migrant Workers34 ex-
presses an intent "to establish norms which may contribute to the 
harmonization of the attitudes of States through the acceptance of 
basic principles concerning the treatment of migrant workers and 
members of their families." Progress, it is acknowledged, has already 
been made on a regional and bilateral basis. The Preamble's accent 
on "the importance and usefulness of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements" (including the Convention itself) provides a formal 
model of international cooperation for helping resolve not only bor-
der-related problems but also broader issues of migration. 
31. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
32. Id. at 879. 
33. Id. at 904. 
34. Supra note 9. 
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Annex 
United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 
A. Non-immigrants Admitted by Class of Admission 
551 
Class of Admission 2004 
All classes ............................................. 30,781,330 
Foreign government officials and families ................. 152,649 
Temporary visitors ..................................... 27,396,031 
For business (total) ................................. .4,593,124 
For pleasure (total) ................................ 22,802,907 
Transit aliens ............................................. 338,175 
Treaty vendors and investors and families ................ 182,934 
Students .................................................. 620,210 
Spouses and children of students ........................... 36,163 
Representatives (and families) to international 
organizations ........................................... 109,355 
Temporary workers and trainees .......................... 684,381 
Spouses and children of temporary workers and 
trainees ................................................. 155,508 
Representatives (and families) of foreign information 
media .................................................... 37,108 
Exchange visitors ......................................... 321,975 
Spouses and children of exchange visitors .................. 38,802 
Fiances(ees) of U.S. citizens ................................ 28,546 
Children of fiances(ees) of U.S. citizens ...................... .4,515 
Intracompany transferees ................................. 314,484 
Spouses and children of intracompany transferees ......... 142,099 
Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act 
[allowing certain family-based immigrants to enter 
or remain in the United States while their 
immigration petitions are pending] ....................... 70,778 
Victims of trafficking and violence ........................... 1,377 
Unknown ................................................. 131,373 
i I; 
J.u 
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B. Immigrants Admitted by Type and Class of Admission 
TyPe and class of admission 2004 
Total, all immigrants ................................... 946,142 
Total, subject to annual numerical limit ................. 423,373 
Total, not subject to annual numerical limit ............. 513,769 
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens ................... 406,074 
Children born to alien residents abroad ................... 707 
Refugees ............................................... 61,013 
Other asylees ............................................. 201 
Other cancellation of removal [Salvadorian, 
Guatemalan, and former Soviet bloc nationals] ...... 30,136 
NACARA [Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act] ................................... 2,292 
HRIFA [Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act] .... 2,451 
Parolees, Soviet and Indochinese ......................... 7,117 
Other .................................................... 3,778 
Total, family preferences ......••••...•..........••••.•. 214,335 
Total, 1st preference [unmarried sons and daughters of 
U.S. citizens] .......................................... 26,480 
Total, 2d preference [spouses and unmarried sons and 
daughters of lawful permanent residents] .............. 93,609 
Total, 3d preference [married sons and daughters of 
lawful permanent residents] ........................... 28,695 
Total, 4th preference [brothers and sisters of over-age-
21 U.S. citizens] ....................................... 65,671 
Total, employment preferences ••••••.•.•.....•....•••• 155,330 
Total, 1st preference [persons of extraordinary ability, 
outstanding professors and researchers] ............... 31,291 
Total, 2d preference [members of professions with 
advanced degrees and persons with exceptional 
abilities] ............................................... 32,534 
Total, 3d preference [other professionals with a 
baccalaureate degree, skilled laborers, and other 
workers] ............................................... 85,969 
Total, 4th preference [miscellaneous employment 
based, such as religious ministers and broadcast 
employees] ............................................... 5,407 
Total, 5th preference [employment-creating 
entrepreneurs] ............................................ 129 
